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INTRODUCTION
As a general matter, our criminal justice system focuses on the
person: who committed the crime and what punishment does that
person deserve? Most of the reforms that have been proposed or
passed over the past nine or ten years have primarily focused on the
who as well, seeking to change the rules under which parole boards
operate, or the ways in which we train or oversee police officers, or
how we address implicit racial biases in judges.1
Yet where plays a significant role in crime and punishment as well.
In fact, in the end, where likely matters more than who. For instance,
crime is densely concentrated. Most reported crimes in any city take
place in only a small fraction of city blocks, with neighborhoods often
maintaining their high- or low-crime status even as the population
within these neighborhoods changes.2 As one scholar points out, it is
easier to predict where a crime will happen in a city than who in that
*

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to Larry
Abraham for his help on this Essay.
1. See, e.g., Destiny Peery, Implicit Bias Training for Police May Help, but It’s
Not Enough, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Mar. 14, 2016, 9:29 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/destiny-peery/implicit-bias-training-fo_b_9464
564.html [https://perma.cc/V8NQ-NXZ9].
2. See generally, e.g., David Weisburd, Place-Based Policing, 9 IDEAS IN AM.
POLICING 1 (2008) [hereinafter Weisburd, Place-Based Policing]; David Weisburd et
al., Trajectories of Crime at Places: A Longitudinal Study of Street Segments in the
City of Seattle, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 283 (2004).
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city will commit it.3 Furthermore, racial disparities in offending are
the product of place, produced in no small part by how government
policies have shaped where people live. Decades of government
policies, such as explicitly segregating public housing,4 explicitly and
implicitly tolerating or encouraging redlining,5 and denying the GI
Bill6 and FHA mortgages (and thus the ability to invest in higherquality housing) to Black Americans,7 all worked to concentrate
disadvantage and social instability in poor, predominantly minority
neighborhoods.8 The cumulative effects of these policies are still felt
today.9
If the story of crime is largely one of place, then the story of
punishment is as well. A significant share of crimes occurs in
proximity to where those who commit them live, so the geographic
concentration of crime concentrates punishment as well. Some
studies talk of “million dollar blocks,” which are single city blocks
that have so many residents behind bars that at any given time the
state is allegedly spending at least $1 million per year to incarcerate
these people.10 As a result, the costs (as well as the benefits) of

3. Weisburd, Place-Based Policing, supra note 2.
4. See J.A. Stoloff, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Office of Policy Dev. &
Research, A Brief History of Public Housing 6 (Jan. 2004) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ended segregation of public spaces, including public housing).
5. See FED. RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, FEDERAL FAIR
LENDING REGULATIONS AND STATUTES: FAIR HOUSING ACT (Jan. 2006),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/fair_lend_fhact.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TAB-BTSF] (“The term refers to the presumed practice of
mortgage lenders of drawing red lines around portions of a map to indicate areas or
neighborhoods in which they do not want to make loans.”).
6. See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN
UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 113,
123–28 (2005).
7. See Richard Rothstein, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated Schools,
and Segregated Neighborhoods—A Constitutional Insult, 7 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 21,
25 (2015).
8. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
9. See John Eligon & Robert Gebeloff, Affluent and Black, and Still Trapped by
Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/
milwaukee-segregation-wealthy-black-families.html [https://nyti.ms/2k2FCNb].
10. See, e.g., ‘Million-Dollar Blocks’ Map Incarceration’s Costs, NPR: ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/02/162149431/
million-dollar-blocks-map-incarcerations-costs [https://perma.cc/Z4KD-TNMM]. I
say “allegedly” because the dollar value is computed by multiplying the average
annual cost of locking someone up in prison by the number of people from that block
locked up that year. But a large fraction of state prison costs is fixed, with nearly
two-thirds of spending going to wages and other benefits for correctional officers and

2018]

THE POLITICS OF PLACE

573

punishment have an impact on place that extends beyond the
individuals incarcerated. A simple but striking example: in one study
of a high-incarceration neighborhood in Washington, D.C., scholar
Donald Braman reported that so many men were behind bars that it
disrupted family formation in that area.11 Healthy family formation
requires a male-female ratio of approximately 50-50, but in some
areas, that ratio fell to about 60 men for every 100 women.12 Since
most people form relationships with those they live close to, this is a
clear geographic cost of punishment.
This Essay explores another connection between punishment and
place: how geography shapes the politics of punishment. To
understand why actors in the criminal justice system act the way they
do, it is essential to understand their incentives, and that requires us
to carefully examine not just who these people are but where they
are. What are the boundaries that define the constituents to whom
these actors respond and thus their incentives and goals?
When we take a closer look at the geography of criminal justice, we
soon see that what we call the “criminal justice system” is not in any
way a system. It is, at best, a web of systems (plural), each of which
faces different pressures and politics due in part to different
geographies. Police are generally city employees who respond to a
police chief who is appointed by a city-elected mayor. Prosecutors
are almost always elected by county electorates, parole boards are
appointed by state-elected governors, and sentencing laws are written
by legislators who are nominally state officials but respond to
constituencies that could span several towns (in rural areas) or barely

other staff. See CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE
PRICE OF PRISONS: EXAMINING STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 9 (2017),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/price-ofprisons-2015-state-spending-trends/legacy_downloads/the-price-of-prisons-2015state-spending-trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RVW-4YE5]. As a result, the marginal
cost of locking up one more person is quite less than the average, often on the order
of one-third to one-seventh as large. See John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER
(Mar. 21, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/711907958368694272
[https://perma.cc/28F4-JALX].
11. See generally DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE:
INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2003).
12. Focusing on the male-female ratio is not meant to dismiss same-sex couples or
the impact that incarceration can have on same-sex couple family formation.
According to the Census, however, only about one percent of all couples identified as
same-sex in 2015, so the primary impact of incarceration on family formation has
been felt by heterosexual couples. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF
SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS, 2015 DATA TABLE, https://www.census.gov/
data/tables/time-series/demo/same-sex-couples/ssc-house-characteristics.html
[https://perma.cc/4DHZ-43G8].
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one neighborhood (in dense cities).13 Judges can be state or county
officials, who are either elected or appointed, depending on the
state.14 Neighborhoods have different goals than their cities, cities
than the counties in which they are located, and counties than the
states they make up.
Sometimes the jurisdictional lines we draw may make sense, but
quite often they appear to be haphazard, if not completely arbitrary.
Why, for instance, do we choose prosecutors along county lines? As
we will see, many actors in the criminal justice system face troubling
or perverse incentives, in no small part because of the constituents to
whom they respond (or the people to whom they don’t respond).15
To examine the role of place in the politics of punishment, this
Essay considers two examples: (1) the decision to elect prosecutors at
the county level, and (2) the impact of locating prisons in rural
communities. Both push us towards greater punitiveness and away
from often-sensible reforms in subtle but important ways that have
started to garner attention among scholars and activists but are still
under-appreciated. One weakness of current reform efforts is that
they rarely target these underlying geographic (and other structural)
issues that led to mass incarceration in the first place. Many of the
same pressures that caused us to over-react to rising crime in the
1970s and 1980s and under-react to falling crime since the 1990s
remain; unless reforms confront these structural issues, it may not
take much of a rise in crime to see many reforms undone.
I. COUNTY PROSECUTORS, CITY CRIME
Perhaps the single most important actor in the criminal justice
system today is the prosecutor.16 Unfortunately, there is a geographic
disconnect that distorts the incentives many of them face in deeply
problematic ways. As a general matter, prosecutors are elected by

13. See Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J.
1528, 1530 (2012).
14. See, e.g., Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_
of_judges.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/2MPS-2QRF].
15. See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017).
16. See generally id.; John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison
Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1237 (2012) [hereinafter Pfaff, The Micro and Macro
Causes of Prison Growth]. See also German Lopez, If You Care About Ending Mass
Incarceration, Look at What Philadelphia Just Did, VOX (Nov. 8, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/8/16622438/larry-krasnerphiladelphia-election-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/57G2-5XYE].
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county electorates, but the communities with the most voting power
are rarely those whose members are most likely to face prosecution.17
As we will see, this separates the costs and benefits of aggressive
enforcement in ways that can lead prosecutors to both under-enforce
and over-enforce criminal laws.
It is hard to understate the power of prosecutors. Granted nearlyunfettered and nearly-unreviewable discretion, prosecutors determine
almost every aspect of a defendant’s case: they decide whether to
press charges or drop the case, whether to divert the case to some sort
of alternative court or push through for a conviction, whether to
charge the defendant with a felony or a misdemeanor, whether to file
a charge that carries a mandatory minimum sentence, whether to seek
jail or prison time as part of the plea bargaining process, and so on.18
Moreover, prosecutors’ offices are better funded and staffed than
government-provided counsel who represent the 80% of defendants
who face prison or jail time and qualify as indigent. This funding
disparity further increases prosecutors’ advantage.19
As a result, prosecutors played a central role in pushing up prison
admissions and populations, especially over the course of the 1990s
and 2000s, as the crime rate fell steadily and the rate of serious crime
fell steeply.20 Between 1994 and 2008, total arrests fell by about 10%
while the number of felony cases filed in state court rose by around
40%; fewer people were entering the system, but more people were
entering prison.21 That increase in filings, a decision wholly within
the purview of the prosecutor, drove prison growth; the other two
plausible sources of prison growth, namely the probability that a
felony case resulted in an admission to prison and the time spent in
prison if admitted, both remained stable over this time.22 At least

17. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 7.
18. See John F. Pfaff, Prosecutorial Guidelines, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 101, 104 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
19. See id. at 106.
20. For more detail, see generally Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison
Growth, supra note 16.
21. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 72. The dates reflect the years for which data was
available.
22. Even if we accept the findings by the Pew Charitable Trusts—that time served
between 1990 and 2009 for property and drug crimes rose by about six months, and
for violent crimes by less than 1.5 years—those increases are still not enough to
explain all that much of the rise in prison populations over the 1990s and 2000s. See
PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST,
LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 3 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/
assets/2012/06/06/time_served_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/88K8-R5JH]; PFAFF, supra
note 15, at 58–59.
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during the period of crime decline, rising incarceration rates were
propelled most significantly by prosecutorial charging decisions.23
Prosecutors have also driven prison growth in other less
immediately-obvious but no less important ways. For example, some
critics of the view that prosecutors are central to prison growth have
argued that legislatures and the judiciary bear a big part of the blame
instead, but this claim ignores the fact that district attorneys shape
these institutions as well.24 District Attorney associations are
effective advocates for harsh new laws and are generally against
efforts at reform.25 And many judges are former prosecutors—far
more than are former defense attorneys—who likely bring with them
a prosecutorial mindset, even if just subconsciously.26
By almost all accounts, their aggressive emphasis on incarceration
was unnecessary, if not actually counterproductive.27 And, as we will
see, geography played an important role in driving this prosecutorial
overreach. But first, it is also useful to look at a far less appreciated
story of problematic prosecutorial leniency that further highlights the
importance of place. As William Stuntz points out, over the 1960s, as

23. See Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 16, at
1252.
24. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (May 2, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/05/02/
the-limits-of-prosecutorial-power [https://perma.cc/G9VZ-KU64].
25. The California Correctional Peace Officers Association has been particularly
effective at arguing for and defending tough-on-crime policies; recent reform efforts
in Louisiana, while admirable, were weakened almost solely due to prosecutorial
concerns; reform efforts in Wyoming, on the verge of success, were scuttled when a
leading prosecutor weighed in in opposition; and so on. See, e.g., Andrew Graham,
Who Killed Criminal Justice Reform?, WYOFILE (Sept. 26, 2017),
http://www.wyofile.com/killed-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/M5HG-93V9];
Jessica Pishko, Prosecutors Are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice
Reform, THE NATION (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutorsare-banding-together-to-prevent-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/B8CHB3XR].
26. See, e.g., Casey Tolan, Why Public Defenders Are Less Likely to Become
Judges—And Why That Matters, SPLINTER NEWS (Mar. 18, 2016, 2:43 PM),
https://splinternews.com/why-public-defenders-are-less-likely-to-become-judges-a1793855687 [https://perma.cc/FG35-2NWQ].
27. See, e.g., DAVID ROODMAN, OPEN PHILANTHROPY PROJECT, THE IMPACTS OF
INCARCERATION ON CRIME 7 (2017), http://files.openphilanthropy.org/files/Focus_
Areas/Criminal_Justice_Reform/The_impacts_of_incarceration_on_crime_10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SAY-ZR89]; Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much
Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy?, 55 J.L. & ECON. 275, 277 (2012);
Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Market Impacts of Incarceration, at 3
(Aug. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Michigan,
Department of Economics), https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mgms/wp-content/uploads/
sites/283/2015/09/incar.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFP6-CYB9].
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crime appeared to start rising sharply,28 incarceration stayed flat, and
at times declined.29 Figure 1, which plots the incarceration rate not in
terms of per 100,000 people (as it usually is shown) but in terms of per
1000 reported violent and property crimes, illustrates this clearly.
Prosecutors (as well as police and other law enforcement officials)
appear to have under-responded to rising crime in the 1960s and
1970s just as much as they over-responded to falling crime in the
1990s and 2000s.
Figure 1. “Effective” Incarceration Rate30

28. I say “appeared” because there is an intriguing discrepancy in our crime
statistics. Over the 1970s and 1980s, serious violent crime rose according to the
Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR”), but generally fell according to the National Crime
Victimization Survey (“NCVS”). The two studies measure crime in very different
ways—the UCR measures crimes reported to local police departments, while the
NCVS surveys thousands of people nationwide about their victimization
experiences—but are trying to describe the same outcome. Some have argued that
the NCVS was a better measure in the 1960s and 1970s, but the explanations often
turn on hard-to-validate and highly contestable assumptions. See, e.g., Janet L.
Lauritsen et al., When Choice of Data Matters: Analyses of U.S. Crime Trends,
1973–2012, 32 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 335, 336 (2016).
29. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28
(2011).
30. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
TOOL, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=daa [https://perma.cc/PMG7-FREK] (data
on file with author).
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Both of these mis-reactions are troubling. The over-reaction in the
1990s and 2000s sent thousands of people to prison with little benefit
to public safety—and might have even made things worse.31 And the
under-reaction in the 1960s and 1970s not only led to excessive
victimization, especially among poorer and more-minority
populations, but it also surely contributed to the tough-on-crime
backlash against seemingly-weak criminal justice policies that helped
drive punitive practices in the 1980s and well into the years after.32
Geography helps us understand both of these mis-reactions,
because both are tied to how prosecutors are elected. The United
States is the only country in the world that elects its prosecutors, and
in forty-seven states these prosecutors are elected at either the county
or (in a few states) the cluster-of-a-few-counties level.33 The decision
to elect at the county level may seem to be an innocuous decision
about voting district size, but it is one that has likely played a major
role in driving, or at least sustaining, punitive practices in the United
States.
The problem with electing prosecutors at the county level arises
from the geographic concentration of crime. To start, crime is much
more frequent in cities than in suburbs. A Brookings Institute study,
for example, reported that in 2008, cities had a violent crime rate of
2129 per 100,000 people, compared to a rate half that, or 1062 per
100,000 people, in those cities’ suburbs; for murder, the most highprofile crime, the relative gap was even larger, at 12 per 100,000
people for cities and 3 per 100,000 people for suburbs.34 Even within
cities, crime is often highly localized, with some studies reporting that
half of all reported crime occurs in fewer than 10% of all city blocks,
and almost all reported crime in at most half.35 For instance, in 2015,
nearly half the increase in murders in Chicago took place in just five

31. Whatever impact prison had on crime in the past, as it stands now, it is likely
that the marginal contribution of an inmate is close to zero, if not zero or negative.
See Johnson & Raphael, supra note 27, at 275–310; Mueller-Smith, supra note 27.
32. See STUNTZ, supra note 29, at 251–52.
33. Ellis, supra note 13, at 1530. The only states that do not elect prosecutors at
the county level are Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey. George Coppolo, States
That Elect Their Chief Prosecutors, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Feb. 24, 2003),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/rpt/2003-R-0231.htm [https://perma.cc/G4CA-9MNX].
34. Elizabeth Kneebone & Steven Raphael, City and Suburban Crime Trends in
Metropolitan America, BROOKINGS INST. (May 2011), https://gspp.berkeley.edu/
assets/uploads/research/pdf/p66.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR5L-GZRQ].
35. Weisburd, Place-Based Policing, supra note 2, at 5.
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neighborhoods, which were home to under 10% of the city’s
population.36
As a result of this concentration of crime, the costs (as well as the
benefits) of enforcement are also concentrated. Crime imposes
serious costs,37 but so too does enforcement. We often focus on the
fiscal costs of enforcement—the approximately $100 billion spent on
policing, the approximately $50 billion spent on state prisons, and the
approximately $30 billion spent on county jails—but there are far
more costs that come from exposure to prison and punishment.38
Prison is a serious vector of sexually transmitted diseases and diseases
like tuberculosis; a study in New York suggested that in the short run,
each year spent in prison shortens life expectancy by two years; the
risk of death from a drug overdose rises precipitously upon release
from prison.39 Prison disrupts existing families, and it impedes
marriage and family formation.40 It leads to significant declines in
already-low incomes for those who go to prison, and it imposes oftenexorbitant costs on incarcerated persons’ families (such as collect calls
that have been known to cost more than $1 per minute).41 No one

36. MAX KAPUSTIN ET AL., UNIV. CHI. CRIME LAB, GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO,
2016, at 17 (2017), https://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/store/2435a5d4658e2ca
19f4f225b810ce0dbdb9231cbdb8d702e784087469ee3/UChicagoCrimeLab+Gun+Viole
nce+in+Chicago+2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY4Y-3GJW]. Those five neighborhoods
ended up explaining 10% of the national increase in homicides between 2015 and
2016. John F. Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Sept. 25, 2017, 6:13 AM),
https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/912304075961708544
[https://perma.cc/2SNZ2JSX].
37. A tool developed by RAND Corporation suggests that the total cost of
reported serious crime in 2016 was on the order of $324 billion dollars, with almost
$150 billion just from homicide. Cost of Crime Calculator, RAND CORP. (using 2016
Crime in the United States, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/36ZW-26NS]),
https://www.rand.org/jie/justice-policy/centers/quality-policing/cost-of-crime.html
[https://perma.cc/RVG8-WVZR]. However, more than half of all violent crimes and
nearly two-thirds of all property crimes go unreported, so an estimate based on
reported crime will be off by more than a factor of two. See John Gramlich, Most
Violent and Property Crimes in the U.S. Go Unsolved, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 1, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/01/most-violent-and-property-crimesin-the-u-s-go-unsolved/ [https://perma.cc/B5DV-494H]. Any estimate of crime is
noisy and rests on a host of methodological choices and assumptions, but the
magnitude of the estimate is still an informative ballpark figure, though one whose
uncertainty must always be kept in mind.
38. See TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE
EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT EXTRACTS, 2012–PRELIMINARY (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5239 [https://perma.cc/6QXJ-264K].
39. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 118–23.
40. Id. at 121.
41. Id.
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has attempted to rigorously aggregate these costs, but they are no
doubt vast.
In short, the costs of crime and punishment are densely—and
disproportionately—concentrated in cities (and within cities). Voters,
however, are distributed much differently. Most Americans live in
suburban or rural areas, not in cities, with a plurality in the suburbs.42
Conventional studies of urbanization compare urban counties (such
as Cook County, Illinois, the home of Chicago) to adjacent suburban
counties (such as DeKalb County, Illinois), and find that there are
about two suburbanites for every urbanite.43 Since the focus of this
Essay is on prosecutors, who are elected within counties, what
matters is the urban/suburban split within those urban counties.
There is far less comprehensive data on this division, but in general, it
suggests that the suburbs make up a significant share of urban county
populations. There are 472,000 people in Atlanta but over 1 million
in Fulton County; only 250,000 people in Buffalo but nearly 1 million
in Erie County; 377,000 in Tampa but 1.3 million in Hillsborough
County; Los Angeles the city has a population of almost 4 million, but
the county has over 10 million; and so forth.44
Not only do suburbs often have higher population counts, but they
seem likely to vote at higher rates as well, at least in urban areas.
Data from the Census Bureau indicate that turnout is higher among
voters who are white, older, and wealthier, all of which tend to
describe residents of many near-urban suburbs.45 Criminal justice
policies play a role here as well. Not only do forty-eight states

42. Jed Kolko, How Suburban Are Big American Cities?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(May 21, 2015, 6:39 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-suburban-are-bigamerican-cities/ [https://perma.cc/9ZP7-W7YH].
43. Id.
44. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/en.html
[https://perma.cc/YSW3-MSZH]. Population data for Milwaukee, Minneapolis and
Madison City from the U.S. Census Bureau, Public Data, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=kf7tgg1uo9ude_&met_y=population&
idim=place:5553000:5548000:2743000&hl=en&dl=en [https://perma.cc/G7JZ-ZYKR].
There are, of course, certainly plenty of exceptions: Milwaukee the city, for example,
has 595,000 people, which is more than half of Milwaukee the county’s 958,000
people. Id.
45. Celia Llopis-Jepsen, Shawnee County Voter Turnout Varies Widely, LowIncome Communities Have the Least Say, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J. (Jan. 21, 2017, 5:30
PM), http://cjonline.com/news/state-government/2017-01-21/shawnee-county-voterturnout-varies-widely-low-income-communities [https://perma.cc/9E65-M3QA]. See
generally THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO VOTES? CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
AND
THE
AMERICAN
ELECTORATE:
1978–2014
(2015),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20577.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JPM-5UD7].
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prevent those in prison from voting (an issue we will turn to again
below), but over thirty deny the vote to those on probation or parole,
and twelve restrict or ban voting even after parole has expired.46
Given that minorities are over-represented in the criminal justice
system(s), they will be over-represented among those whose votes are
restricted.47 And even when not formally excluded from voting, areas
with more minority voters often face larger practical hurdles for
voting, and these hurdles have only grown worse in places where
protections under the Voting Rights Act were weakened following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder.48
The story within cities is somewhat more complicated, but still
shares important parallels with the broader urban/suburban one. On
the one hand, we should see the suburban story replicated to some
extent, albeit perhaps to a lesser degree. Crime is not only
concentrated within cities as compared to suburbs, but even within
neighborhoods in those cities.49 The safer neighborhoods will be
wealthier and whiter, and more likely to have higher voter turnout
rates.50 Like their suburban counterparts, these safer urbanites will
view crime and punishment more as abstractions than lived
experiences. On the other hand, urban residents tend to be more
liberal than those in the suburbs, and they are more likely to have at
least some contact with people exposed to the criminal justice system,
which may—may—make them more sensitive to the costs of
enforcement.

46. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felonydisenfranchisement-laws-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/9Q2B-FE22].
47. The impact of felony disenfranchisements laws is unclear. Some have argued
it plays an important role, especially in close elections. See, e.g., Christopher Uggen
& Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 778 (2002). Thomas
J. Miles, however, has suggested that this effect could be overstated. Thomas J. Miles,
Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85 (2004).
48. 570 U.S. 2 (2013). For the impact of Shelby County, see Election 2016:
Restrictive Voting Laws by the Numbers, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 28,
2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2016-restrictive-voting-lawsnumbers [https://perma.cc/Q2M4-89QR]. See generally Daniel Weeks, Why Are the
Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-andminorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/ [https://perma.cc/D9K9-8FT2].
49. See David A. Graham, Red State, Blue City: The United States Is Coming to

Resemble Two Countries, One Rural and One Urban. What Happens When They
Go to War?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/

archive/2017/03/red-state-blue-city/513857/ [https://perma.cc/XE8M-638F].
50. See id.
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Taken together, these competing distributions of crime and
punishment on the one hand, and voting power on the other, strongly
suggest that those with the most political power when it comes to
electing the prosecutor will be those least exposed to the costs of that
prosecutor’s enforcement decisions. This account can help explain
the two trends we noted at the start of this section. When crime
started to rise in the 1960s, suburbanites were relatively indifferent,
since they were not really experiencing the harms—and as Figure 1
indicates, prosecutorial behavior appears to have reflected that.
After the urban riots in the 1960s and 1970s, suburbanites and white
urbanites began to fear crime more, and likely began to fear urban
social disorder more generally—less because of the direct physical
threat it posed to them and more because it stoked racial fears and
resentments.51 And so suburban voters cracked down.52 But the
demand for prosecutorial punitiveness did not stop when the crime
rate started to fall, since those with political power appreciated the
sense of safety (and perhaps benefited from it as they moved back to
city), but they still did not bear the costs of excessive or inefficient
punishment.53
In other words, prosecutorial reactions to crime are not driven
(entirely) by the crime rate, but rather by how that crime rate shapes
the attitudes of those voters least exposed to it. Right now, those
attitudes appear to lead to excessive punitiveness, but in the past they
also appear to have contributed to excessive indifference. Both cases
highlight the problem of separating the costs and benefits of a
program from those who decide what the program should look like.
Furthermore, while there exists very little research on this issue, this
geographic split between political power and the experience of crime
and punishment may explain some other irregularities we see in
criminal justice outcomes. For example, some critics of current
policies argue that our priorities are often misplaced, pointing out
that we made over 1.5 million arrests for drug offenses and over 1
million arrests for various vice crimes, even while more than one-third
of all murders resulted in no arrest (and, if past data are any
indication, perhaps as many as two-thirds of all murders of Black
51. For a discussion on the impact of urban riots in places such as Detroit and
their impact on white America’s views on criminal justice, see STUNTZ, supra note 29,
at 35.
52. See id.
53. To be clear, I am not proposing geography as some sort of mono-causal theory
here. Other factors surely explain toughness and leniency. Geography, however, is a
key factor that either helped drive the trends or at least enabled the other forces
shaping them to push things more dramatically.
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men).54 Some of the emphasis on drug and vice crimes may be
justifiable—some argue that low-level arrests are important ways to
gather information to clear serious crimes like homicide and rape55—
but the geographic story I describe above suggests that at least some
of the focus on drugs and vice is excessive. I suspect that this
discrepancy exists because those in safer urban and suburban
neighborhoods can envision drug and vice crimes as ones which might
affect them or their families. Their children are unlikely to be killed,
but they could be exposed to drugs. So they have an incentive to push
law enforcement and prosecutors to target crimes such as drug
trafficking.
The policy recommendation that immediately flows from this is
that we should not elect prosecutors at the county level, but at a more
local level. At the very least, perhaps we should have two elected
offices in urban counties: one for the city and another for the non-city
parts. So rather than a Cook County office or an Erie County office,
we would have a Chicago office and non-Chicago Cook County
office, or a Buffalo Office and a non-Buffalo Erie County office. It
may not be necessary for every ring suburb to have its own separate
prosecutor’s office—there are surely some efficiencies of scale we
should take into account—but an urban-suburban split deserves far
more attention than it gets.
To be clear, such a split does not automatically mean that city
prosecutors would immediately become less punitive (although given
that more-progressive prosecutors won numerous elections in 2016,
that would likely be the case at this particular moment in time).56 In

54. 2016 Crime in the United States: Estimated Number of Arrests, FBI: UCR,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/
table-18 [https://perma.cc/GGR3-VW3Y]; 2016 Crime in the United States:
Clearances, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/
topic-pages/clearances [https://perma.cc/NX7L-ANL4]. For the clearance rates for
Black male victims, see generally, JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF
MURDER IN AMERICA (2015).
55. See, e.g., Peter Moskos (@PeterMoskos), TWITTER (Sept. 27, 2017, 11:19
AM), https://twitter.com/PeterMoskos/status/913105759453552652 [https://perma.cc/
7UZ4-JWA7]; @deputybarksdale, TWITTER (Sept. 27, 2017, 12:01 PM),
https://twitter.com/deputybarksdale/status/913116354722582528
[https://perma.cc/
38LX-VHM3] (Twitter conversation between the author and former law
enforcement officers who offer anecdotal support for this assertion).
56. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Whitney Tymas, Election Night Saw Victories in
Local Criminal-Justice Reform—This Should Be the Beginning, THE NATION (Nov.
12, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/election-night-saw-victories-in-localcriminal-justice-reform-this-should-be-the-beginning [https://perma.cc/CUZ4-Q5N3]
(describing how progressive candidates won local prosecutor races in November
2016).
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fact, they could end up being harsher in many cases—but that could
be a good thing. We want prosecutors to respond to changing
conditions, including cracking down as crime rises, something we did
not see happen in the 1960s and early 1970s. Ideally, however, morelocal prosecutors would respond to these increases in smarter ways
than they did in the past, and in ways that better reflect the policy
preferences of urban constituents. I also expect that they would be
more likely to rein in their punitiveness faster were crime rates to
decline.
A slightly more modest approach—one that does not require any
jurisdictional shakeups and has already been implemented to at least
some degree in several counties—is “community prosecution,” which
emphasizes the need for district attorneys’ offices to take local
community concerns into account.57 Jurisdictions that embrace this
idea establish satellite offices in neighborhoods throughout the
county so that assistant prosecutors have better contact with those
communities and thus respond more readily to their shifting
concerns.58 The elected prosecutor at the top is still chosen by an
electorate over-represented by suburbanites, but the more-local
offices are likely an improvement over traditional, more-centralized
approaches.59
There is a growing appreciation for the power of prosecutors and
their impact on incarceration rates and on punishment rates more
broadly—and thus a growing awareness that reforms need to focus on
regulating their behavior. A key part of understanding who
prosecutors are and what they do, however, is understanding where
they are, and what that means about the incentives that they face.
Before moving on, a brief but important point: while I have
focused here on the views of those least affected by crime and
punishment—since they have the largest political voice—I do not
want to silence those who are most affected but have the weaker say
57. See, e.g., JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
COMMUNITY PROSECUTION STRATEGIES: MEASURING IMPACT 1 (2002),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/192826.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X6P-FAC6].
58. Id. at 5–6.
59. There are few empirical assessments of community prosecution. One of the
few argues that it seems to effectively reduce some crimes with little to no downside.
See Thomas J. Miles, Does the “Community Prosecution” Strategy Reduce Crime?
A Test of Chicago’s Experience, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 117, 117 (2013). Note,
though, that the only metric of success that Miles looks at is “reduced crime.” While
this metric is important, there are surely other margins that concern us as well. If
community prosecution has no clear impact on crime but improves the public’s view
of the criminal justice system or makes people feel more acknowledged by a major
government agency, then community prosecution may still be quite justifiable.
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in elections. It is easy to tell a story in which the criminal justice
system consists of white suburban and urban voters imposing a
repressive regime on Black citizens who lack any political clout to
resist. And there is certainly some validity to this claim. Yet the
views of those who live in poorer, higher-crime communities are
complex and deserve our attention. Several recent studies, for
example, have shown that Black elites in these communities have
often pushed for tough-on-crime laws when crime rates are rising,
since it is their communities that have borne the brunt of those
harms.60 The attitudes of those in high-crime areas, however, are
frequently far more pragmatic than those who live elsewhere: tougher
when crime goes up, but less tough as crime goes down, with a greater
emphasis on what actually works rather than what is symbolically
satisfying.61 Any full accounting of the politics of punishment thus
needs to also account for both the political resistance and support that
arises in black communities.
II. PRISONS AND THE CENSUS
Another way in which geography shapes the politics of punishment
is through the physical location of prisons. Not surprisingly, the surge
in prisoners in the United States led to a simultaneous boom in prison
construction, and between 1970 and 2010, state and federal agencies

60. See generally JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN (2017); MICHAEL J.
FORTNER, BLACK SILENT MAJORITY (2015). But see Vesla M. Weaver, The Untold
Story of Mass Incarceration, BOS. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/racelaw-justice/vesla-m-weaver-untold-story-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/LFR37HVP].
61. On racial differences in pragmatic versus expressive views of punishment, see
generally Steven F. Cohn et al., Punitive Attitudes Toward Criminals: Racial
Consensus or Racial Conflict, 38 SOC. PROBS. 287 (1991). A 2016 survey of crime
victims by the Alliance for Safety and Justice revealed this more pragmatic take
clearly. The report demonstrated that victims tend to hold views that are less
punitive than the public as a whole, and less punitive than what our policies look like.
The reason for this quickly becomes clear. The survey’s sample is disproportionately
young and minority—because crime victims tend to be young and minority. Given
both their greater exposure to the harms of overly-aggressive enforcement and their
greater understanding of blurry lines between “offender” and “victim” (people fall
into both categories far more often than our simple narratives suggest), they are less
likely to emphasize punitive responses to crime and more likely to favor “restorative
justice” approaches that aim to reintegrate the people guilty of the crime while still
taking accountability for the harms they caused. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE,
CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS
ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 4–5 (2016), https://www.allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/documents/Crime%20Survivors%20Speak%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YV5T-BC3W].
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built over 1100 new prisons.62 These prisons had to be sited
somewhere, and in the end they were frequently located away from
urban centers; nearly 70% of prisons are now in non-metropolitan
towns.63
This geographic choice has certainly not gone unnoticed, although
most of the scholarship has focused on the impact of prisons on the
economic health of these rural communities.64 There has also been
some analysis of the impact of rural prison siting on prisoners and
their families, given that crimes (and thus prisoners) are
disproportionately concentrated in urban areas. In the New York
State system, for example, about 45% of all people sent to prison in
2016 were from New York City65—yet over half the state’s maximum
security prisons are at least 200 miles away from New York City, and
there have been no state prisons located in New York City itself since
the Arthur Kill facility on Staten Island was closed in 2011.66 In 2004
(the last year with data), about two-thirds of all prisoners nationwide
were housed more than 101 miles away from home, with over 10%
more than 500 miles away.67 Such distance imposes real emotional
costs on inmates and their families: it impedes visits, it forces families
to rely more on expensive collect calls, and it creates other significant
financial costs, such as the resources needed to go visit loved ones in
far-flung prisons (bus fare, hotel rooms, lost wages, etc.).68 There is

62. John M. Eason, Prisons as Panacea or Pariah? The Countervailing
Consequences of the Prison Boom on the Political Economy of Rural Towns, 6 SOC.

SCI. 7, 7–8 (2017) (surveying prison boom in rural communities).
63. Id.
64. Id. The general finding in this literature is that the impact of prisons is slight
at best, if not moderately harmful, although Eason’s work suggests that these results
may be too pessimistic once we account for selection bias; the towns that seek out
prisons are ones that are already suffering more than others, and so prisons may not
make things improve, but they could slow or stop the decline already underway. Id.
65. 2012–2016 Dispositions of Adult Arrests, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/G2XQ-DAS3].
66. Post Staff Report, SI’s Arthur Kill Correctional Facility Closed, Six Others
Shuttered, N.Y. POST (Jan. 3, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://nypost.com/2012/01/03/sis-arthurkill-correctional-facility-closed-six-others-shuttered [https://perma.cc/K4CR-TPLM];
Facilities Overview, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/
facilities.page [https://perma.cc/GZ4Q-J7HP] (providing an overview of state penal
facilities in New York City, with none having been constructed since the Arthur Kill
facility closed).
67. See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Koph, Separation by Bars and Miles:
Visitation in State Prisons, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/prisonvisits.html [https://perma.cc/7EHW-SP92].
68. See generally Meghan M. Mitchell et al., The Effect of Prison Visitation on
Reentry Success: A Meta-Analysis, 47 J. CRIM. JUST. 74 (2016).
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also some mixed evidence that making visits more difficult weakens
family ties in ways that lead to a greater risk of recidivism upon
release.69
In this Essay, however, I want to examine how the decisions about
where to locate prisons shape the politics of punishment in general
and of prison reform more specifically. In particular, it is important
to understand how prison siting and Census Bureau policies interact
to create a powerful group opposed to reducting prison populations:
rural legislators. Legislators with prisons in their districts already
have an incentive to resist closures because of the perceived economic
benefits; the Census issue only strengthens that resistance, in
important but often underappreciated ways.
The key issue is this: for the purposes of Census enumeration,
where does a prisoner “reside”? Does he live in the prison? Or does
he live at his last known address prior to incarceration? The Census
relies on the “usual residence” rule—where the person “lives and
sleeps most of the time”—which for incarcerated people that means
the facilities in which they are serving their time.70 And forty-six
states (all but California, Delaware, Maryland and New York) choose
to follow the Census rule: incarcerated people “live” in their
prisons.71 As a result, having prisons filled to capacity may not just be
an issue of economic gain for rural legislators, but one of political
survival.
There are two intertwined effects at play. The first, and most
obvious, is one of apportionment. When states are drawing the lines
for local, state, and federal election districts, they are required to
ensure that all districts have roughly the same number of people.72
Counting prisoners as “residing” in their prison cells (even though
many state codes and constitutions explicitly state that prison cells

69. The effect is not as clear as a quick look at the data suggests; it is hard to
separate the extent to which family visits reduce the risk of re-arrest or readmission
from the fact that those least likely to recidivate in the first place probably have
stronger family ties and thus more visits. Id.
70. RESIDENCE RULE AND RESIDENCE SITUATIONS FOR THE 2010 CENSUS, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/resid_
rules.html [https://perma.cc/4QLM-AQWL].
71. Note that in California and Delaware the move away from the Census rule
does not take effect until after the 2020 Census. See Prison Gerrymandering Project,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org [https://perma.cc/
N7EX-AZ4G].
72. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–44 (1983).
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cannot be considered “residences”73) shifts representation from
more-urban areas (where crime is concentrated) to more-rural ones
(where prisons are often located).
In more-local elections, this sort of “prison gerrymandering” can
have outsized effects. In perhaps the most infamous case, one
municipal district in Anamosa, Iowa, consisted of 58 real, voting
residents, compared to nearly 1400 in all other districts, because the
rest of its population was incarcerated in the local jail (and therefore
unable to vote); that district’s representative won his election with
exactly two votes.74 In Wyoming, two state senate districts were
redrawn to shift a state prison from one district to the other to ensure
that two incumbents did not have to challenge each other in the wake
of redistricting.75 More broadly, in Pennsylvania eight districts drawn
subsequent to the 2000 Census would not have met equal-vote
requirements were it not for their prisons,76 and when New York
State abolished prison gerrymandering, Republican legislators
successfully pushed to add a seat to the senate—an effort to offset
their expected losses from the resulting redistricting that favored
more-liberal New York City.77
As touched upon earlier, there is a second, even more pernicious
impact from counting prisoners as “residing” where they are
incarcerated. In all but two of the forty-six states that “prison
gerrymander” (the exceptions being Maine and Vermont), people
incarcerated in prisons cannot vote while behind bars.78 This turns a

73. See Peter Wagner et al., Fixing Prison-Based Gerrymandering After the 2010
Census: A 50 State Guide, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 2010),

https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states [https://perma.cc/32Q8-BWAY].
74. Anamosa has since fixed this problem. See Prison-Based Gerrymandering in
Iowa, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 8, 2010), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/
factsheets/ia/iowa.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5NF-V5YK].
75. See Peter Wagner, Intentional Prison-Based Gerrymandering Found in
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Mar.
4,
2012),
Wyoming,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2012/03/04/wyoming
[https://perma.cc/
8UWY-RTUM].
76. See Fixing Prison-Based Gerrymandering After the 2010 Census:
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Mar.
2010),
Pennsylvania,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states/PA.html
[https://perma.cc/VS6WKKGT].
77. See Sasha Chavkin & Michael Keller, GOP Wants New Senate Seat, N.Y.
WORLD (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/gop-wants-newsenate-seat/article_8ce4df3c-7eb3-5b21-8ce2-b53fc1bbe2ae.html [https://perma.cc/2Y
W8-ACHJ].
78. See LALEH ISPAHANI & TRICIA FORBES, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION & RIGHT
TO VOTE, VOTING WHILE INCARCERATED: A TOOL KIT FOR ADVOCATES SEEKING TO
REGISTER, AND FACILITATE VOTING BY, ELIGIBLE PEOPLE IN JAIL, at iii (2005),
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geographic distortion into a partisan one. In 2015, approximately
35% of prisoners were Black and 22% were Hispanic; only 34% were
white (with approximately 9% other races).79 Both Black and
Hispanic individuals are disproportionately likely to vote for
Democratic candidates: one study by the Pew Research Center in
2014 reported that 80% of Black citizens and 56% of Hispanic citizens
identified as Democrats and Democratic-leaning.80
Yet rural
counties—where prisons tend to be located—are generally
conservative and have grown increasingly so.81
In other words, prisons shift Democratic-leaning voters to moreRepublican districts where they count for representation but cannot
vote. Even if those who engage in criminal behavior are less likely to
vote in the first place (perhaps because of age, poverty, or other
personal traits),82 shifting their residency to more-rural areas weakens
the political power of the communities from which they come, which
(like the prisoners themselves) are disproportionately Democraticleaning.83
To drive the point home bluntly: prison gerrymandering is, in a
84
very real way, an even-worse Five-Fifths Compromise.

https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/votingrights/votingwhileincarc_20051123.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PJ6L-JXVW].
79. See E. Ann Carson & Elizabeth Anderson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2015, BULL. NO. NCJ 250229, Dec. 2016, at 13 tbl.8,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG49-FJTN].
“Hispanic,” of course, is not a race, but an ethnicity. Here, “white” refers to “white,
non-Hispanic” and Black to “black, non-Hispanic.” Thus “Hispanic” includes both
Blacks and whites.
80. See A Deep Dive into Party Affiliation: Sharp Difference by Race, Gender,
Generation, Education, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.peoplepress.org/2015/04/07/a-deep-dive-into-party-affiliation
[https://perma.cc/MWV7WAT2]. Furthermore, even though whites tend to lean Republican, poorer whites
have generally been less likely to be Republican than richer whites. See generally
Razib Khan, The Upper Class Is More Republican, DISCOVER MAG.: BLOG (Mar. 25,
2012, 3:31 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2012/03/the-upper-class-ismore-republican/ [https://perma.cc/Y7M7-K95R]. To the extent that prisoners,
including white inmates, come from poorer communities, the white voters in prison
are likely disproportionately Democratic compared to whites outside of prison.
81. See Lazaro Gamio, Urban and Rural America Are Becoming Increasingly
Polarized, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
politics/2016-election/urban-rural-vote-swing [https://perma.cc/Q9UM-Y2CW].
82. See, e.g., Miles, supra note 47, at 115 (suggesting that disenfranchisement laws
have little electoral effect because of the seeming pre-disenfranchisement voting
behavior of the disenfranchised).
83. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 49.
84. The Three-Fifths Compromise in the U.S. Constitution counted slaves in
slave-owning states as three-fifths of a person for enumeration purposes. Leah
Sakala, Prison-Based Gerrymandering’s Striking Resemblance to the Infamous
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The impact of prison gerrymandering on prison reform is clear: it
creates a strong constituency that is opposed to reform because their
very jobs depend on keeping the prisons near them full. Politicians in
prison districts care about the economic benefits of prisons, but that is
an issue more of staffing than of prisoners: a half-empty prison with a
full staff of guards is just as economically beneficial as that prison
with the same number of guards, but more prisoners.85 The way the
Census data is used for district apportionment, however, forces those
politicians to care about the number of prisoners, and thus makes
them resistant to all but the most tepid of reforms.
Eliminating prison gerrymandering will be tricky. Look back at the
four states that have replaced it: California, Delaware, Maryland, and
New York. A common trait is that all four are solidly Democratic
states; in fact, when each passed its law reversing prison
gerrymandering, the Democrats controlled both chambers of the
legislature and the governor’s mansion.86 Such a “trifecta” is likely
Three-Fifths
Clause,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Sept.
9,
2011),
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2011/09/09/three-fifths/ [https://perma.cc/
5B2U-4UFW]. Today, like slaves then, prisoners cannot vote, but they count as a full
(five-fifths) person for purposes of representation, moving even more political
“weight” to areas where they are detained without political voice.
85. States are often quite adept at cutting prison populations while keeping
facilities open and guards employed. See, e.g., Ken Stier, NYS Prison Budget Climbs,
Despite Fewer Inmates, CITY LIMITS (Nov. 10, 2015), https://citylimits.org/2015/11/10/
nys-prison-budget-climbs-despite-fewer-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/7TPG-DC6G]; see
also PFAFF, supra note 15, at 98–104.
86. See California State Assembly Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010),
https://ballotpedia.org/California_State_Assembly_elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/
D44U-VQF4] (California passed its law in 2011); California State Senate Elections,
2010,
BALLOTPEDIA
(2010),
https://ballotpedia.org/California_State_Senate_
elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/CA3J-6ENG] (California’s governor at the time was
Democrat Jerry Brown); Delaware House of Representatives Elections, 2010,
BALLOTPEDIA (2010), https://ballotpedia.org/Delaware_House_of_Representatives_
elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/5NUR-X9QE] (Delaware passed its law in 2010);
Delaware State Senate Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), https://ballotpedia.org/
Delaware_State_Senate_elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/7MQH-8XBB] (Delaware’s
governor at the time was Democrat Jack Markell); Maryland House of Delegates
Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), https://ballotpedia.org/Maryland_House_of_
Delegates_elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/DM4J-6XZT] (Maryland passed its law
in 2010); Maryland State Senate Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010),
https://ballotpedia.org/Maryland_State_Senate_elections,_2010
[https://perma.cc/
SAD2-7CBK] (Maryland’s governor at the time was Democrat Martin O’Malley);
New York State Assembly Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010),
https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_State_Assembly_elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/
Q427-A6UF] (New York passed its law in 2010); New York State Senate Elections,
2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_State_Senate_
elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/FRY4-FVZ8] (New York’s governor was Democrat
Andrew Cuomo, and 2010 was one year before the creation of the Independent
Democratic Caucus, a breakaway group of eight Democratic Senators who caucus
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essential for any law to repeal prison gerrymandering, given the
explicitly Republican-leaning partisan impact of counting people from
cities as non-voting rural residents.
That political reality suggests that state-level reforms of prison
gerrymandering will be rare these days. As of 2017, only six states
have Democratic trifectas, and two of those are California and
Delaware.87 It only takes one Republican institution to block a
reform bill, especially if the legislature cannot override a veto. There
was a push in 2016 to get the U.S. Census Bureau to reform its policy
and count prisoners as “residing” where they had lived prior to their
incarceration,88 but as of now Census has not acted on the proposal,
and given the general chaos engulfing that agency right now, any sort
of action would be surprising, even before accounting for likely
partisan resistance.89 But had the Census Bureau decided to change
the rule (and to be clear, its preferred position entering discussions
was to keep counting prisoners as residing in prisons), it is likely that
few, if any, states or local communities would have taken steps to regerrymander their counts. This is one area where the federal
government could have had a major, almost instantaneous impact on
criminal justice policy. That, however, seems unlikely to happen right
now.
Yet there is some potential for reform, at least at the local level.
Even if the federal and state governments refuse to change their
districting laws, local governments remain free to avoid
gerrymandering for local seats—and hundreds of counties and cities

with the Republican Party and thus give the Republicans control of the senate
despite having a minority of the members).
87. The remaining four are Connecticut, Hawaii, Oregon, and Rhode Island. For
a list of states with trifectas, see State Government Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/State_government_trifectas [https://perma.cc/2397-CF7H].
88. See A Sample of the Comment Letters Submitted in 2016 to the Census
Bureau Calling for an End to Prison Gerrymandering, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/letters/FRN2016.html [https://perma.cc/URL76QJM].
89. The Director of the U.S. Census Bureau unexpectedly resigned in May of
2017, and Trump’s first budget was seen as substantially underfunding the Census
Bureau as it prepares for the 2020 Census. See Tara Bahrampour, U.S. Census
Director Resigns Amid Turmoil Over Funding of 2020 Count, WASH. POST (May 9,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/us-census-director-resignsamid-turmoil-over-funding-of-2020-count/2017/05/09/8f8657c6-34ea-11e7-b41262beef8121f7_story.html?utm_term=.67a85ebb3314 [https://perma.cc/MDJ7-CH45];
Clare Foran, Why Did the U.S. Census Director Resign?, THE ATLANTIC (May 10,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/census-director-resigns2020-funding-concern/526107/ [https://perma.cc/UZ7V-VQE5].
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have done just that.90 And the fact is that gerrymandering will have
its biggest impact at the smaller, more-local levels. A New York State
Assembly district has nearly 130,000 people in it, and a state senate
seat almost 315,000.91 The largest prisons in New York hold
approximately 2000 to 3000 prisoners each day,92 so the overall
impact is not that large (although, eliminating prison gerrymandering
statewide likely resulted in shifting partisan control of at least one
Senate seat overall). For elections in prison towns, however, 2000 to
3000 inmates would have a far bigger impact—though, of course,
those municipal representatives are not setting major criminal-justice
policies.93
CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system is not a single coherent “system,” but
rather a somewhat—or sometimes extremely—chaotic collection of
agencies, each responding to a unique set of incentives.94 And these
incentives are, quite frequently, strongly shaped by who the
constituents are, which is determined by where the constituents are.95
The two examples above highlight the need to account for place, and
how thinking about where these agencies are helps us better
understand what they are going to do, and thus what sorts of reforms
we may need to enact.96 These are, of course, not the only examples
of place’s role in shaping punishment: one effort to abolish plea
bargaining famously failed because the city police refused to make
the changes that the county prosecutors asked of them,97 and the slow
90. Local Governments that Avoid Prison-Based Gerrymandering, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Nov.
19,
2016),
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/local/
[https://perma.cc/YC9A-SQHW].
91. 2010 Census Population for NYS Legislative Districts and Congress, CTR. FOR
URBAN RESEARCH (2017), https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/AcademicsResearch-Centers-Initiatives/Centers-and-Institutes/Center-for-Urban-Research/
CUR-research-initiatives/2010-Census-population-for-NYS-legislative-distric
[https://perma.cc/D25U-264T].
92. See, e.g., Don Melvin, History of Tough Inmates, CNN (June 8, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/08/us/new-york-clinton-correctional-facility/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ZF6W-CVW9].
93. The local official with the most power to shape criminal justice outcomes—the
prosecutor—is unaffected by gerrymandering. His constituency is determined by the
physical borders of the county, not by the number of people in it or where they are
classified as living.
94. See discussion supra Introduction.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. When Harry Connick, Sr., the district attorney for Orleans Parish, LA (yes,
Harry Connick, Jr.’s father) attempted to abolish plea bargaining, the New Orleans
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decline in prison populations we have seen since 2010 has not been
the result of states decarcerating, but of urban counties in those states
decarcerating even as rural counties in the same states continued to
The examples here, however, do
become more punitive.98
demonstrate the importance of thinking carefully about where
criminal justice actors are when deciding what reforms to adopt.

(city) Police Department refused to change its procedures in the way he wished.
Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV.
2055, 2059 (2006).
98. This suggests not just that divisions within counties explain prosecutorial
behavior, but differences across counties as well. Josh Keller & Adam Pearce, This

Small Indiana County Sends More People to Prison than San Francisco and Durham,
N.C. Combined. Why?, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/upshot/new-geography-of-prisons.html
[https://nyti.ms/2jQTP2O].

